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The Debt-Equity Labyrinth: A Case for
the New Section 385 Regulations
Alexander Lewitt*
“Our present taxing system has become a labyrinth for the wary
and unwary alike, filling endless volumes with its exceptions to
exceptions, and indecipherable differentiations in the way we tax
various sources of income.”1
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I. Introduction
Corporations routinely borrow money from subsidiaries,
shareholders, and other related parties.2 This often occurs when
they are in financial trouble and unrelated parties are reluctant to
lend to them.3 In recent years, for example, Sears Holdings, Inc.,
parent company of iconic American retailers Sears and Kmart,
borrowed hundreds of millions of dollars from hedge funds
controlled by its chairman and largest shareholder, Edward
Lampert, to fund massive losses.4 These types of related-party
loans raise important tax questions regarding whether they should
be characterized as debt or equity.5 Loans between related parties
2. See Christopher Matthews, The Next Big Thing in Corporate-Tax
Avoidance, TIME (Apr. 3, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/04/03/the-next-bigthing-in-corporate-tax-avoidance/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (“U.S. multinational
companies routinely set up units in low tax jurisdiction to pool cash from their
global operations and lend to other parts of the business . . . .”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See SANDEEP DAHIYA, ANTHONY SAUNDERS & ANAND SRINIVASAN,
FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND BANKING LENDING RELATIONSHIPS 25 (2002),
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/asaunder/Financial_Distress_and_Relationship_ban
kpap_Jan7_2002.pdf (“The risk of loan default is the one of the most important
risks faced by banks.”). But see Daniel McNulty, Why Hedge Funds Love
Distressed
Debt,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/
bonds/08/distressed-debt-hedge-fund.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (arguing that
hedge funds love to invest in companies with distressed debt) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See Antoine Gara, As Ailing Sears Bleeds Cash, Billionaire Eddie
Lampert Increases Loans to Retailer, FORBES (Aug. 25, 2016, 11:22 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2016/08/25/as-ailing-sears-bleeds-cashbillionaire-eddie-lampert-increases-loans-to-retailer/#6f07e786af36 (last visited
Dec. 7, 2017) (“Sears reported yet another large quarterly loss and said Lampert
will loan the company $300 million as it seeks to sell or divest brands . . . .”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See Nathan Bomey, How Sears CEO Lampert Cashes In as Stores Cash
Out, USA TODAY (Mar. 22, 2017, 4:24 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
money/2017/c3/22/sears-holdings-ceo-eddie-lampert/99487518/ (last visited Dec.
7, 2017) (noting how Lampert is structuring transactions with Sears to have his
$389 million in unsecured notes issued to Sears be treated as debt in anticipation
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often involve different motives and terms than arm’s length loans
and involve the potential for abuse.6 Even when related parties do
not own a majority of a company’s stock, they may effectively sit in
a position of control that allows them to manipulate events to their
advantage.7 This is especially true in situations when companies
are in financial distress and have limited options for raising
capital.8 Related parties are willing to extend credit when
unrelated parties are not because they face different consequences
and can earn potential benefits that are not available to unrelated
parties.9 This is an age-old problem that corporate taxpayers and
the government wrestled over for decades.10 Corporations desire
clarity with respect to tax rules and flexibility with respect to the
ability to raise capital (especially when they are in financial
trouble),11 while the government wants to prevent abuse of the tax
of liquidation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. See Art Berkowitz & Richard Rampell, Related-Party Transactions Can
Be an Investment Red Flag, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 29, 2002, 6:37 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1030635386991264875 (last visited Feb. 27,
2017) (“[Related-party transactions] aren’t necessarily wrong, but because of their
delicate nature and the risk of abuse or fraud, they must be carefully scrutinized
and usually fully disclosed.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. See, e.g., Zetlin v. Hanson Holding, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387, 388 (N.Y. 1979)
(noting that control of 44.4% of a corporation’s stock “represented effective
control”).
8. See infra Part VII.C (providing an example of this type of situation and
applying the common law, the 1980 regulations, and 2016 regulations on how to
distinguish debt from equity).
9. See Tong Yan & Wang Huacheng, Related Party Transactions, Benefits
of Control and Earnings Quality, 2 FRONTIER BUS. RES. CHINA 187, 187 (2008)
(concluding that “when the share ratio of controlling shareholder is less than 50%,
they prefer pursuing private benefits of control via related party transactions”).
10. Compare William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of
Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369, 412–530
(1971) (outlining the various factors courts have taken into consideration in
determining whether an instrument should be treated as debt or equity), with
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-10 (1980) (setting forth the various rules on how to
distinguish debt from equity), and Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-3T (2016)
(prescribing rules on how to differentiate debt from equity).
11. See Kimberly Clausing, The Real (and Imagined) Problems with the U.S.
Corporate Tax Code, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 6, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/thereal-and-imagined-problems-with-the-u-s-corporate-tax-code (last visited Dec. 7,
2017) (“The U.S. raises less corporate tax revenue than peer countries do, and the
system is mind-numbingly complex, rife with distortion, and widely perceived to
be unfair. The corporate community is also concerned that our current system
inhibits competiveness, holding American companies back.”) (on file with the
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laws by corporations trying to disguise equity investments as debt
in order to take advantage of interest deductions or to create large
tax carryforwards that increase their value to potential
acquirers.12
Take the example of Company A, which is on the verge of
bankruptcy.13 It will not meet its next monthly payroll or other
monthly obligations unless it immediately raises $100 million. It
spoke to its banks, who are unwilling to extend it any further
credit, and its investment bankers told it that the public markets
are inhospitable to a public debt or equity offering. Its only option
is to borrow money from a hedge fund, Vulture Hedge Fund, that
accumulated its stock and, more importantly, its bonds at
significant discounts to their face value. Vulture is willing to lend
Company A $100 million on the following terms (subject to a
binding written agreement): (1) a one-year loan with a fixed
maturity date secured by all of Company A’s real estate;
(2) interest payable monthly in arrears at an annual rate of ten
percent with a five-day grace period, after which Vulture can
demand immediate repayment of principal, declare an immediate
default, and pursue its remedies as a creditor; (3) the loan is
convertible into seventy-five percent of Company A’s stock in the
event of default; (4) Vulture gets three of Company A’s seven board
seats now and two more board seats upon default; and (5) Vulture
is provided with access to monthly financial reports from the
company and whatever other information it reasonably requests.
The loan ranks senior to all of Company A’s existing debt and
equity. At the time Vulture offers to make the loan, it owns
thirty-five percent of Company A’s common stock and forty-five
percent of its public bonds. While this does not constitute majority
Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See Leslie Picker, Companies Hurt by Treasury Crackdown Win
Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/
14/business/dealbook/exemptions-made-to-treasurys-tax-saving-restriction-rules.
html?_r=1 (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (“Part of the Treasury’s goal [in enacting
Section 385] was to clamp down on a tax-saving strategy called earnings
stripping, where the American subsidiary of an inverted company borrows money
from its foreign parent and uses the interest payments on the loans to take a tax
deduction.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. This example is taken up in more depth at the end of this Note. See infra
Part VII.C (providing an analysis of how the common law, the 1980 regulations,
and the 2016 regulations would characterize this example).
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ownership, it effectively constitutes control. Having no alternative,
Company A agrees to the deal. The question is whether this loan
should be characterized as debt or equity even though Vulture does
not own a majority of Company A’s stock or bonds. As we will see,
bright-line rules fail to effectively address this type of real world
situation and a flexible approach is needed to deal with the
complexities of modern corporate finance.
Part II of this Note provides background information on ways
the government has attempted to distinguish debt from equity.14
Part III offers a primer on why corporations choose to finance their
operations with debt.15 Part IV details how the courts have dealt
with determining whether an instrument should be considered
debt or equity prior to 1980.16 Part V discusses how the Treasury
Department’s 1980 regulations determined an instrument’s status
as either debt or equity.17 Part VI describes the 2016 regulations,
which were issued to make the same determination.18 Part VII
provides illustrative examples of debt-financed companies
(including Company A) to show how the common law, the 1980
regulations, and the 2016 regulations would affect each example
differently, for better or worse.19 Next, Part VIII argues that the
2016 regulations are an appropriate response to the debt-equity
issue.20 Part VIII also notes that although the 2016 regulations are
an appropriate response, there is still room for improvement
within the regulations.21 Finally, Part IX proposes targeted
improvements for the regulations and recommendations for how
corporations can deal with this issue.22

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Infra Part II.
Infra Part III.
Infra Part IV.
Infra Part V.
Infra Part VI.
Infra Part VII.
Infra Part VIII.
Infra Part VIII.
Infra Part IX.
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II. Background
Since the inception of the interest deduction,23 the courts,24
Congress,25 and the Treasury Department26 all tried to address
situations like Company A’s with inconsistent results. Until 2016,
the government relegated this problem to the courts.27 Due to a
lack of guidelines regarding how to distinguish debt from equity,28
the common law produced multi-factored tests.29 The courts’ use of
these multi-factored tests resulted in inconsistent outcomes based
on balancing the relevant facts of each case.30 Concerned with the
23. See Payne-Aldrich Act, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 113 (1909) (current
version at 26 U.S.C. § 163 (2012)) (allowing a corporation to deduct “interest
actually paid within the year on its bonded or other indebtedness”). Originally, a
corporation was limited to deducting interest on debt in an amount of debt that
was equal to the amount of money a corporation received from its shareholders in
exchange for shares of stock. See id. (limiting the amount of interest deductions a
corporation could take within a given year). Congress eliminated this limitation
in 1918. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 234(a)(2), 40 Stat. 1057, 1077
(eliminating the limitation on the amount of debt a corporation could deduct).
24. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 369 (revealing how the courts have dealt
historically with the debt-equity debacle).
25. See S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 106 (1969) (agreeing with the House that “it
is appropriate to specifically authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe
the appropriate rules for distinguishing debt from equity”).
26. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-10 (1980); Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.385-1–1.385-3T (2016).
27. Although legislation was passed that gave the Treasury Department the
authority to prescribe regulations to distinguish debt from equity in 1969,
regulations never achieved full affect until 2016. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub.
L. No. 91–172, § 415(a), 83 Stat. 487, 613 (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 385
(2012)) (delegating to the Secretary of the Treasury Department the authority to
prescribe regulations that distinguish debt from equity); T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B.
69 (withdrawing the 1980 proposed regulations); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-3T
(2016) (enacting final regulations).
28. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 369 n.4, n.8 (noting the lack of a statutory
definition and the Court’s reluctance to define equity or debt); Lawrence M. Stone
& C. Kevin McGeehan, Distinguishing Corporate Debt from Stock Under Section
385, 36 TAX L. REV. 341, 344 (1981) (“Despite the importance of this distinction,
the Code contains no definition of either stock or debt.”).
29. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 407 (mentioning that courts have
“habitually recite[d] a varying list of as many as 16 criteria or factors to be
considered”).
30. See id. at 408 (“In consequence, it has justly been said that the courts are
at liberty to arrive at opposite results on identical facts depending upon their own
whims as to which factors they wish to stress . . . .” (quoting Stuart M. Weis, The
Labyrinth of the Thin Corporation, 40 TAXES 568, 589 (1962))).
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lack of a bright-line rule, Congress enacted provisions to address
the issue in the Tax Reform Act of 1969,31 which gave the Secretary
of the Treasury Department authority to prescribe regulations to
classify instruments as either debt or equity.32
The Treasury Department did not exercise its express
administrative authority in this area until 1980, when it issued
final regulations under § 385 (1980 regulations).33 That exercise
was far from successful.34 The main criticism of the 1980
regulations concerned their complexity.35 Fortunately for critics,
the regulations’ effective date was delayed until 1983, when the
Treasury Department withdrew them altogether.36 The stated
reason for the Treasury Department’s decision was that the
proposed regulations did “not fully represent the position of the
Treasury or Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) on matters
concerning debt and equity.”37 While the Treasury Department’s
stated reason left many unanswered questions, some viewed the
31. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91–172, § 415(a), 83 Stat. 487,
613 (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 385 (2012)) (adding § 385 to the I.R.C.).
32. See id. (authorizing the Treasury Department to “prescribe such
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to determine whether an interest
in a corporation is to be treated . . . as stock or indebtedness”).
33. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-10 (1980) (issuing for the first
time regulations to distinguish debt from equity).
34. The Treasury Department regulations were postponed multiple times
before ultimately being withdrawn. See id. § 1.385-1(a)(1) (“The regulations under
section 385 apply . . . after April 30, 1981”); T.D. 7774, 1981-1 C.B. 168 (amending
the regulations to apply after December 31, 1981); T.D. 7801, 1982-1 C.B. 60
(extending the regulations effective date to June 30, 1982); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.385-1(a)(1) (as amended by T.D. 7822 in 1982) (postponing the regulations
effective date until after comments are incorporated into a final rule); T.D. 7920,
1983-2 C.B. 69 (withdrawing the regulations).
35. See, e.g., Stone & McGeehan, supra note 28, at 392 (questioning how the
problems surrounding the classification of an instrument as either debt or equity
can be resolved with these complex and comprehensive provisions); Felix B.
Laughlin, The Debt-Equity Regulations (Section 385), 28 WM. & MARY ANN. TAX
CONF. 9, 30 (1982) (noting that the rules “have been criticized as being overly
complex”); Jack S. Levin & Stephen S. Bowen, The Section 385 Regulations
Regarding Debt Versus Equity: Is the Cure Worse than the Malady?, 35 TAX LAW.
1, 41 (1982) (“It can only be hoped that the Secretary or the Congress will
ultimately realize that more law does not always mean more certainty, and will
take steps to simplify these regulations.”).
36. See T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69 (providing for the withdrawal of the 1980
final regulations).
37. Id.
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decision to withdraw the regulations as an implicit recognition of
their flaws.38 Thirty-three years later in 2016, under the Obama
administration, the Treasury Department issued proposed
regulations under § 385.39 The new Proposed Regulations were
initially very broad in scope,40 yet when promulgating final
regulations under § 385, the Treasury Department substantially
restricted their scope.41
III. Debt Financing
Corporations can choose to finance their business operations
by issuing either bonds or stocks, or both.42 A corporate bond
represents a debt instrument that is held by a creditor.43 Notes
38. See, e.g., James J. Tobin, Proposed § 385 Regulations Go Way Too Far,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.bna.com/proposed-385regulations-n73014446402/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (“Treasury issued proposed
and final regulations under § 385 in 1980 that were subsequently withdrawn,
presumably after recognition of their many problems.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
39. The Obama administration’s motive in finalizing regulations under § 385
was because of tax inversion and earning stripping transactions. See Reuters,
Republicans Want the Obama Administration to Delay Corporate Inversion Rules,
FORTUNE (Oct. 6, 2016, 7:46 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/10/06/republicansobama-administration-corporate-inversion-rules/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2017)
(disclosing that the proposed regulations were issued as “part of the Obama
administration’s effort to stop a wave of tax inversion mergers”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
40. See generally Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-4, 81 Fed. Reg. 20912
(April 8, 2016); Victor Fleischer, On Inversions, the Treasury Department Drops
the Gloves, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/
business/dealbook/on-inversions-the-treasury-department-drops-the-gloves.html?_r=0
(last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (“The proposed regulations are . . . aggressive and
expansive . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
41. See Wade Sutton, Donald Trump, Section 385, and Consolidated Groups,
44 J. CORP. TAX’N 33, 33 (2017) (noting that many of the issues associated with the
proposed regulations “have been satisfactorily addressed in the final rules”).
Compare Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-4, 81 Fed. Reg. 20912 (April 8, 2016)
(giving the Treasury Department broad discretion to treat instruments as either
debt or equity), with Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-3T (2016) (cutting back on the
proposed regulations).
42. See Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best
World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1058 (2000) (“Corporations finance their operations
by raising debt and equity capital.”).
43. See id. at 1059 n.5 (describing the terminology for debt instruments).
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refer to short term loans made by lenders to a corporation.44 Bonds
refer to long term loans (i.e., for a period of five or more years).45 A
debt instrument is governed by a contract between borrower and
lender that sets forth the terms of the loan (often called a “Note”
or an “Indenture”). Typically, the debt contract sets forth the
stated term of the bond, a maturity date, the amount the corporate
issuer is obligated to pay on the maturity date, and the interest
rate paid to the holder throughout the term of the bond.46 A
corporation that chooses to finance its operations through the
issuance of bonds must pay interest, whether stated or effective,
on the bonds to the bondholder.47 Under the Internal Revenue
Code (I.R.C.), corporations can deduct the interest payments on the
bond from taxable income.48 Dividends paid to shareholders do not
reduce the corporation’s taxable income.49
If a corporation issues stock instead of debt, the shareholder
becomes an equity owner of the corporation.50 A corporation that
issues stocks is not required to pay dividends to stockholders.51
Rather, cash distributions on equity generally rest within the
discretion of the corporate board after considering the need for and
potential use of retained earnings.52 Often, corporations may
choose to finance operations through debt financing because it

44. Id.
45. See id. (defining bonds).
46. See id. at 1059 n.5 (giving the characteristics of a typical bond).
47. See id. at 1060 (explaining debt financing).
48. I.R.C. § 163(a) (2012); see also Pratt, supra note 42, at 1061 (delineating
the different tax consequences of debt financing and equity financing).
49. See Pratt, supra note 42, at 1061 (“[A] corporation . . . cannot deduct the
dividends it pays on the shares it issues.”).
50. See
Equity,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/e/equity.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (“In finance, you can think of equity
as one’s degree ownership in any asset after all debts associated with that asset
are paid off.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
51. See Pratt, supra note 42, at 1061 (noting that a corporation can retain
earnings instead of paying out earnings in the form of dividends).
52. See Leonard Chazen, How the Influx of Dividend-Minded Shareholders
Will Impact Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REG. (NOV. 22, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/11/22/how-the-influxof-dividend-minded-shareholders-will-impact-shareholder-activism/ (last visited
Dec. 7, 2017) (examining the role of the board of directors in making dividend
payments) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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reduces a corporation’s tax liability and reduces their net cost of
capital.53
IV. The Common Law
In the early years of dealing with the issue of whether a
financial instrument constituted debt or equity, courts addressed
the issue by looking to “the four corners of the instrument.”54 This
“four corners” approach ultimately failed because courts had
difficulty dealing with hybrid securities and intracompany loans
made by shareholders.55 In response, courts developed multi-factor
tests to aid in making a determination under the “four corners”
approach.56 Nevertheless, these factors failed to provide a brightline rule because courts varied on the number of factors used57 and
the weight of those factors.58 In reviewing the problems
encountered by the courts, some patterns can be identified from
53. See Pratt, supra note 42, at 1062–64 (summarizing the differences
between debt and equity financing by way of example). Although the use of debt
financing has its advantages, it also has its disadvantages. See Claire
Boyte-White, How Does a Company Choose Between Debt and Equity in Its
Capital
Structure?,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Mar.
25,
2015,
1:11
PM),
http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/032515/how-does-company-choosebetween-debt-and-equity-its-capital-structure.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (“The
downside of debt financing is that lenders require the payment of interest,
meaning the total amount repaid exceeds the initial sum. In addition, payments
on debt must be made regardless of business revenue.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
54. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 405–06 (observing that courts initially
relied on the text of an instrument “to draw the distinction that the law
required”).
55. See id. at 406–07 (discussing the difficulties courts encountered by
taking the four corners approach).
56. For a complete list of factors courts habitually utilized, see Fin Ray
Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968) (listing sixteen
factors courts have taken into consideration in the Third Circuit) and Estate of
Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 1972) (highlighting thirteen
factors courts in the Fifth Circuit have taken into consideration).
57. Compare Mixon, 464 F.2d at 402 (indexing thirteen factors), with Fin
Ray Realty Co., 398 F.2d at 696 (specifying sixteen factors), and Anchor Nat’l Life
Ins. Co. v. C.I.R., 93 T.C. 382, 400 (1989) (finding eleven factors).
58. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 408 (“[I]t has justly been said, that the
courts are at liberty to arrive at opposite results on identical facts depending upon
their own whims as to which factors they wish to stress . . . .” (quoting Stuart M.
Weis, The Labyrinth of the Thin Corporation, 40 TAXES 568, 589 (1962))).
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their application.59 These patterns divide into three criteria
regarding whether an instrument constitutes debt or equity:
formal rights and remedies of creditors, objective determination of
intent, and risk and economic reality.60
A. Formal Rights and Remedies of Creditors
Courts identified the following formal rights and remedies of
creditors as characteristics of debt instruments: a fixed maturity
date, remedies for default, subordination, certainty of income,
absence or inadequacy of interest payments, participation in both
success and failure of the business, participation in control of the
business, and the name of the instrument.61 Courts considered the
presence of a fixed maturity date a critical factor.62 While a fixed
maturity date alone was insufficient to ensure treatment as debt,63
the absence of a fixed maturity date was “most often conclusive” of
equity treatment.64 A fixed maturity date was lacking if the courts
found an instrument to have no reasonable expectation of
repayment in the future or if the courts found an unreasonable
postponement of payment.65
Another important factor weighing in favor of equity
treatment was the absence of a right to force payment upon
default.66 Generally, subordination of a debt to other creditors
supported a finding of equity treatment, whereas a
59. See id. at 411–12 (providing a list of typical evidentiary factors employed
by courts).
60. See id. (dividing the evidentiary factors into four sections).
61. See id. (listing the factors most commonly identified by the courts).
62. See id. at 413 (“The most important of the formal factors is a provision
for a fixed . . . time when the purported creditor is unconditionally entitled to
require payment of the principal.”).
63. See id. (“The presence of a maturity date does not guarantee recognition
of indebtedness, if other factors indicate an equity investment . . . .”).
64. Id.; see also Lane v. United States, 742 F.2d 1311, 1315–16 (11th Cir.
1984) (analyzing the absence of a fixed maturity date under the multi-factored
common law test).
65. Reasonableness was determined by a subjective evaluation of the
particular circumstances of a corporation. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 415–16
(clarifying reasonableness).
66. See id. at 420 (revealing that this finding “is a very significant, if not
essential factor”).
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non-subordinated debt supported a finding of debt treatment.67
Courts gave participation in management or control of the
corporation little weight.68
A debtholder is entitled to interest payments on a loan.69 A
court’s finding that interest was payable regardless of whether it
was “dependent upon a discretionary determination by the board
of directors” helped establish the existence of a debt.70 Typically
where there was no or inadequate interest, courts treated the
purported debt instrument as equity.71
Courts found a purported debt instrument that makes
repayment of principal contingent on the success of the venture
akin to an equity investment in the corporation.72 As such, courts
considered those types of arrangements to support a finding of
equity treatment.73 Labeling an instrument debt does not
67. With respect to subordination, “the financial community regards
subordinated debt as quasi-equity.” Id. at 422. As a result, the holder of a
subordinated debt was not seen as having rights significantly different from that
of a preferred stockholder. See id. (noting this factor as one that “strongly
indicates that the holders were sharing in the risk of the venture in a manner
more compatible with the status of stockholders than creditors”). Usually
subordination was determined at the time the instrument was issued. Id. at 423.
Where there is a finding of subordination as one of a number of factors leading to
treating an instrument as equity, courts have failed to recognize an instrument
as equity. See id. at 426 (“Frequently, the courts will justify any degree of
subordination, on the ground that it was necessary in order to meet . . . capital
requirements or to facilitate outside financing and credit . . . .”). A finding of
subordination, however, is not itself enough to cause a court to treat an
instrument as equity. See id. at 423–24 (noting that although subordinated debt
is similar in priority to preferred stock, it may differ significantly). Therefore, in
weighing the multitude of factors, the weight given to subordination varies. See
id. at 421–27 (detailing the varying weight courts have given to subordination).
68. See id. at 447–49 (describing that “it is all but impossible to find a
decision in which [participation in control] has been applied”).
69. See id. at 431 (furnishing that interest payments in some form are a
common attribute of debt).
70. Id. Moreover, “some cases hold otherwise if the interest will become
absolutely payable at a fixed ultimate maturity date.” Id.
71. See id. at 433–34 (observing how courts have dealt with a lack of or
failure to pay interest rates).
72. See id. at 442 (explaining that a purported debt instrument that seeks
payment based on a percentage of profits or sales “lacks even the form of a debt”).
73. See id. (stating that these types of arrangements are “generally viewed
as resulting in a proprietary investment in the risk of the business, a device
adopted in order to share the financial results of the operations along with the
shareholders”).
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conclusively support a finding of debt, but a lack thereof, such as
labeling an instrument preferred stock, supports a finding of
equity.74
B. Objective Determination of Intent
Courts identified the following factors as bearing on the
intention to create a debtor-creditor relationship: formal
documentation, security and sinking fund provisions,
proportionality, guarantees by shareholders, payment history, and
failure to enforce a default.75 Courts that assessed intent focused
on the particular facts and circumstances that bore on each
particular case.76
Neither formal documentation of an unconditional promissory
note or bond, nor treatment of an instrument as a liability on a
corporation’s balance sheet, “can obscure the substance of the
transaction.”77 The failure of a corporation to formally document
an instrument as debt presented a strong indication of equity
treatment.78 The presence of a valid security interest that placed
the lender in a position superior to general creditors supported a
finding of debt.79 In contrast, the absence of a security interest did
not support a conclusive finding of equity.80 The absence of a
74. See id. at 450 (“If an instrument is labeled ‘preferred stock,’ the taxpayer
has very little chance of getting it treated as debt . . . .”).
75. See id. at 412 (indexing the various factors courts used to establish
whether an intention to create a debtor-creditor relationship existed).
76. See id. at 458 (“[M]ost courts today would agree that the characterization
of purported debt for tax purposes must be determined . . . [by looking at] the
intent as objectively ascertained by looking beneath mere form to all relevant
facts and circumstances.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
77. Id. at 461.
78. See id. at 462 (observing that “failure of the taxpayer to follow form may
well be used as evidence that debt was not intended”). This factor is a precursor
to the documentation requirements in the 2016 Regulations that disqualify an
instrument from being treated as a debt instrument if the parties do not
thoroughly document the terms of the instrument. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2
(2016) (setting forth the documentation requirements).
79. See id. at 466 (adding that this evidence is “powerful”).
80. Some courts have found this failure to be merely “a permissible
subordination of the debt, to certain other creditors and purchasers.” Id. at 467.
Other courts have found it to be “evidence of a lack of a bona fide intention to
create a debt.” Id.
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sinking fund also did not conclusively support a finding of equity
treatment, although the presence of a sinking fund provided strong
evidence for a finding of debt treatment.81
With respect to proportionality, a finding of a purported debt
held in substantial proportion to corporate stock created a strong
inference of equity treatment.82 Some courts only used this to
support a finding of equity treatment if there were other
significant factors present.83 In contrast, when a court found a
purported debt to be held disproportionately to the corporate stock,
the court usually respected the instrument as debt.84 The courts
typically considered an instrument as debt when capital was
extended by an outside creditor of the corporation, was guaranteed
by shareholders to satisfy a general policy of a lender, and whose
proceeds were used to prevent deterioration of assets of the
corporation through salary or dividend payments.85
Timely repayment of a bond was considered evidence of an
intent to create a debt.86 Repayment of debt did not support this
intent if offset by new advances, advances made for temporary
purposes, advances made to equalize advances of different
shareholders, if repayment was determined by the cash needs of
the corporation and shareholders rather than pursuant to a
binding obligation,87 or if payments were precipitated by a tax
audit.88 Some courts found the existence of an intent to repay the
debt only if a corporation made faithful payments of interest when
81. See id. at 469 (“The absence of a sinking fund or some form of reserve to
provide for the ultimate retirement of purported debt is often referred to as
evidence of the lack of an unconditional intent that the obligation be repaid . . . .”).
82. See id. at 470 (describing the importance of such a finding as “very
pertinent” and one which gives rise to a “strong inference”).
83. See id. at 471 (“But ordinarily there must be ‘something more,’ . . . to
support the inference that the shareholder did not really intend to act like a
creditor.”).
84. See id. at 473 (“The farther we get from proportionality, the more respect
is paid to the form in which the parties have cast their arrangement.”).
85. See id. at 487 (finding that the “decisions have turned to a large extent
on the finding that the creditor’s insistence upon a guaranty did not signify that
the corporate capital was thought to be inadequate, but reflected a general policy
of banks”).
86. See id. at 490–91 (specifying this factor is “persuasive”).
87. Id. at 491.
88. Id. at 492.
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earnings were lacking.89 On the other hand, “[t]he significance of
payment of interest as evidence of intention is limited when the
corporation has earnings, which could as readily have been paid
out as dividends.”90
Failure to enforce a default was strong evidence of a lack of
intent to establish a debtor-creditor relationship, especially if the
creditor allowed extended defaults in principal payments,
continued advances after multiple defaults, unreasonably
extended the maturity date, or deferred a demand for payment.91
These failures were evidence of a “state of mind . . . akin to that of
an ordinary shareholder who understands that his investment is
subject to the risks of the venture.”92 Defaults on the payment of
interest were seen as less significant than principal defaults.93 The
failure to make interest payments completely, paying interest at a
corporation’s convenience, or creditors making interest payments
themselves, supported findings of equity.94 In assessing this factor,
courts took into consideration the intent of the parties not only at
the time of the loan but also at the time of default.95
C. Risk and Economic Reality
Courts overlooked debt formalities and the intent of the
parties if the economic reality of the arrangement did not comport
with the creation of a debt instrument.96 In determining economic
reality, courts looked at the adequacy of capitalization, the source
of repayments, the use of funds advanced, and the willingness of
an independent creditor to advance funds on comparable terms.97
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 493.
92. Id. at 493–94.
93. Id. at 494.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 496 (“Even if the requisite intention to be a true creditor existed
at the outset, enlarged needs of the business or other altered circumstances may
bring about a change in the intention, . . . and what was once a debt may thus be
transformed into an equity investment.”).
96. See id. at 503 (revealing that purported debts may not be respected if
economic realities point to a sham).
97. See id. at 412 (recording the evidentiary factors court take into
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Courts considered a corporation’s capitalization, as evidenced
by its debt-to-equity ratio, important, but not conclusive, in
distinguishing debt from equity.98 Since balance sheets do not
always represent the true value of the assets available for debt
repayment, courts looked further to determine if repayment of a
purported debt was expected from other sources, such as
off-balance sheet assets, balance sheet assets carried at values
below their true market value, and profits or free cash flow, that
showed a creditor expected to be repaid from these sources.99 A
court was more likely to treat an instrument as equity rather than
debt if a corporation expected repayment primarily or exclusively
from the liquidation of assets.100 If the funds were used to purchase
“core assets” of a business, a court was more likely to consider them
equity rather than debt.101 But if an independent party would have
advanced the funds on similar terms, a court was more likely to
find that the advance was debt rather than equity.102
V. The 1980s Approach
On December 31, 1980, the Treasury Department issued final
regulations under § 385 of the Internal Revenue Code.103 The
Treasury Department sought to create bright-line rules that were
largely absent under the common law.104 Initially the regulations
consideration).
98. See id. at 510 (noting that the courts came to realize that “an amount of
equity capital that would be inadequate to launch a corporation in one industry
may be quite sufficient by the standards of another, and that within one industry
the standard may vary with the type of operation planned”).
99. See id. at 513–20 (discussing how courts analyzed the debt-to-equity
ratios of corporations).
100. See id. at 526 (“If the uncertainties of successful operation are such that
only reasonably assured source of funds for repayment, at maturity or within a
reasonable time, is the liquidation of the enterprise, a strong inference arises that
no such drastic action would be contemplated by the purported creditor.”).
101. See id. (pointing out that in the case of a corporation formed to sell real
estate,“the very business of the corporation is the liquidation of its assets”).
102. See id. at 530–35 (explaining the independent creditor test).
103. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-10 (1980).
104. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385, 45 Fed. Reg. 18957, 18958 (Mar. 24, 1980)
(“The question of whether an instrument in a corporation is stock or indebtedness
has created considerable difficulties and led to much litigation.”).
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were not scheduled to take effect until April 30, 1981.105 Because
of the controversy fomented by these regulations, however, the
Treasury Department continuously extended the deadline for their
application until January 1, 1983.106 Finally, on November 3, 1983,
the
Treasury
Department
withdrew
the
regulations
107
retroactively. Although these regulations never took effect, they
illustrate how the Treasury Department overreached by trying to
apply a rules-based approach to an area of corporate taxation that
requires flexibility and the ability to focus on substance over
form.108
A. Scope
The regulations issued in 1980 would have applied to all
financial instruments,109 including preferred stock,110 some
unwritten obligations,111 and guaranteed loans.112 All other
interests113 were outside the scope of the regulations and were
treated as equity or debt under applicable principles of existing
common law.114

105. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1(a) (1980) (supplying the effective date).
106. See T.D. 7774, 1981-1 C.B. 168 (extending the effective date of the
regulations from May 1, 1981, to January 1, 1982); T.D. 7801, 1982-1 C.B. 60
(changing the effective date of the regulations from January 1, 1982 to July 1,
1982).
107. See T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69 (notifying taxpayers of the withdrawal of
the 1980 regulations).
108. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-10 (1980).
109. See id. § 1.385-3(c) (defining “instruments” as “any bond, note,
debenture, or similar written evidence of an obligation”).
110. See id. § 1.385-2(e)(4) (providing that § 1.385-10 contains rules
pertaining to the treatment of purported preferred stock).
111. See id. § 1.385-2(e)(1) (noting that § 1.385-7 contains rules “that apply to
certain loans of money made to a corporation by persons other than independent
creditors that are not evidenced by an instrument within six months after the day
they are made”).
112. See id. § 1.385-2(e)(3) (“Section 1.385-9 contains rules that apply to loans
made to a corporation and guaranteed by a shareholder.”).
113. See, e.g., id. § 1.385-1(b)(1) (setting forth a few examples of what
constitutes other interests, “such as bank deposits, insurance policies, claims for
wages, and trade accounts payable”).
114. Id. § 1.385-1(b)(1).
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B. Preliminary Rules
To understand the substantive rules set forth in the
regulations it is necessary to lay out three operational rules that
would have applied to more than one instrument classification.
The first operational rule is the determination of the fair market
value of an instrument.115 The second is the calculation of the
debt-to-equity ratios.116 The third is the determination of a
reasonable interest rate.117
1. Fair Market Value of an Instrument
Understanding fair market value is critical for three reasons.
First, it aids in determining the proper classification of a hybrid
instrument when holdings of stock and instruments are not in
substantial proportion.118 Second, it facilitates the determination
of whether the consideration paid for an instrument is excessive or
inadequate.119 Finally, it assists in ascertaining whether a
substantive change occurred in the terms of an instrument.120
The regulations defined the fair market value of an
instrument as “the price at which it would change hands between
a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge
of all relevant facts.”121 To provide clarity, the regulations
suggested that, in determining fair market value, a taxpayer may
115. See Jesse V. Boyles & Randolph J. Rush, The Regulations under Section
385: A Review, Evaluation, and Suggested Approach, 27 VILL. L. REV. 52, 66 (1981)
(laying forth the three operational rules of the 1980 § 385 regulations).
116. Id. at 67–74.
117. See id. at 74–82 (asserting why corporations need to ascertain a
reasonable rate of interest).
118. Id. at 66; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(a) (1980) (laying forth the special
rules for determining whether a hybrid instrument is held in substantial
proportionality to stock).
119. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 66; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a)
(1980) (prescribing the proper method in calculating excessive or inadequate
consideration).
120. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 66; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(j)
(1980) (presenting what constitutes a change in terms).
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(1)(i) (1980); see also Boyles & Rush, supra note
115, at 66 (reiterating the definition of fair market value).
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use present value and standard bond tables under the § 1232
regulations.122 The regulations also set forth two rules of
convenience to help accommodate taxpayers.123 The first rule
provided that the fair market value of a straight debt instrument
is equal to the face amount if the interest rate is reasonable124 and
the amount “paid for the instrument is equal to the face value.”125
The second rule provided that the fair market value of an
instrument registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission and sold for cash to the public is the issue price.126
When determining the fair market value of an instrument or the
reasonableness of an interest rate, the Treasury Department,
however, could disregard a non-commercial term of the
instrument.127
2. Debt-to-Equity Ratio
Understanding and calculating a corporation’s debt-to-equity
ratio was important in determining whether a particular rate of
interest was reasonable under the substantial proportionality
rules,128 whether a corporation had excessive debt under the
substantial proportionality rules,129 and whether a corporation had
excessive debt in determining the proper classification of
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(1)(ii) (1980); see also Boyles & Rush, supra note
115, at 67 (restating the regulations).
123. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2) (1980); see also Boyles & Rush, supra note
115, at 67 (laying out the two rules of convenience).
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(i)(A) (1980); see also Boyles & Rush, supra
note 115, at 67 (disclosing that reasonableness for the stated annual rate of
interest is determined under § 1.385-6(e)).
125. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(i)(B) (1980); see also Boyles & Rush, supra
note 115, at 67 (clarifying the rule of convenience for fair market value).
126. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(ii) (1980); see also Boyles & Rush, supra note
115, at 67 (noting that issue price is “defined in section 1232(b)(2)”).
127. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 67. This finding may only be made “if
the principal purpose of the inclusion of the term is to increase or decrease the
fair market value of the instrument (or a reasonable rate of interest for the
instrument).” Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(1)(iii)(A) (1980).
128. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 67; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(2)
(1980) (clarifying when a reasonable rate of interest will be found).
129. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 67; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(1)
(1980) (specifying that if a debt is excessive then it will be treated as stock).
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unwritten obligations.130 The regulations defined a corporation’s
debt-to-equity ratio as: “[T]he corporation’s liabilities (excluding
trade accounts payable, accrued operating expenses and taxes, and
other similar items) bear to . . . [t]he stockholder’s equity.”131
Stockholder’s equity was defined as a corporation’s excess of the
adjusted basis of its assets over its liabilities.132 The regulations
required the use of proper accounting principles in determining the
adjusted basis of a corporation’s assets (which is needed to
determine stockholder’s equity) and the amount of its liabilities,
excluding treatment of any interest as equity or indebtedness by
reason of § 385.133 Preferred stock is a liability, however, if under
§ 385, it is treated as indebtedness.134
The debt-to-equity ratio analysis is incomplete because it fails
to take into account off-balance sheet assets that have substantial
value,135 as well as the value of intangible assets carried on the
balance sheet at less than their fair market value.136 As a result, it
provides an inadequate analysis of solvency and a corporation’s
ability to repay an instrument as of the time it enters into an
obligation.137
130. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 67; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(b)(2)
(1980) (“A loan to which this section applies is treated as a contribution to capital
if the debtor corporation has excessive debt when the loan is made (under the
principles of § 1.385-6(f)).”).
131. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(1) (1980); see also Boyles & Rush, supra note
115, at 67 (restating the definition of a corporation’s debt-to-equity ratio).
132. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(2) (1980); see also Boyles & Rush, supra note
115, at 68 (restating the definition of stockholder’s equity).
133. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 68; see also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.385-6(g)(3)(i) (1980) (setting forth the operating rules for determining the
adjusted basis of a corporation’s assets and the amount of a corporation’s
liabilities).
134. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 68; see also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.385-6(g)(3)(ii) (1980) (establishing the effects of classifying indebtedness as
preferred stock under § 385).
135. See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING,
FINANCE AND AUDITING FOR LAWYERS 129 (6th ed. 2013) (1997) (giving four
examples of off-balance sheet financing arrangements in which corporations
engage).
136. See id. at 236 (“[E]conomic goodwill . . . is never recorded on a balance
sheet.”).
137. See Michael C. Thomsett, Why Companies’ Balance Sheets Can Be
Misleading,
MINT
LIFE:
BLOG
(OCT.
19,
2010),
https://blog.mint.com/investing/balance-sheet-10192010/ (last visited Feb. 27,
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3. Reasonable Rate of Interest

Identifying a reasonable rate of interest was essential for four
reasons. First, it aided in determining whether an instrument
issued for property other than money should be classified as equity
or debt.138 Second, it facilitated the determination of whether the
rule of convenience under § 1.385-3(b) applies in determining the
fair market value of the instrument.139 Third, it helped in assessing
whether a demand instrument should be classified as equity or
debt under § 1.385-6(l)(1).140 Fourth, it supported a finding of
whether a demand instrument or certain other obligations, as
defined in § 1.385-7(a), classified as debt may be reclassified as
equity.141
The regulations provided that a reasonable interest rate is
determined based on industry standards.142 Further, the
regulations provided greater ease of compliance by setting forth a
rule of convenience. The rule of convenience considers an interest
rate reasonable if equal to: (1) the rate in effect under § 6621;143
(2) the prime rate in effect under any local bank; (3) “a rate
determined from time to time by the Secretary taking into
consideration the average yield on outstanding marketable
obligations of the United States of comparable maturity”; or (4) a
2017) (“A disturbing reality about financial statements is that they are inherently
inaccurate and incomplete.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
138. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 74; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(d)(1)
(1980) (describing what occurs when an instrument not issued for money is
treated as equity).
139. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 74; see also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.385-3(b)(2)(i) (1980) (providing the rule of convenience for determining fair
market value).
140. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 74; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(l)(1)
(1980) (supplying rules for the initial classification of an instrument payable on
demand).
141. Boyles & Rush, supra note 115, at 74; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(l)(2)
(1980) (elaborating on the circumstances in which a demand instrument will be
reclassified as equity); id. § 1.385-7(c)(1) (explaining the circumstances in which
a certain other obligation will be reclassified as equity).
142. See id. § 1.385-6(e)(1) (imposing what is considered a reasonable annual
rate of interest).
143. Section 6621 of the I.R.C. provides rules for determining an overpayment
and underpayment rate of interest. For more information on these rules, see
generally I.R.C. § 6621 (2012).
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rate between any of the rates described and “at the end of the
taxable year
in which the determination is made, the
debt-to-equity ratio is not greater than 1:1.”144
C. Treatment of Instruments Generally
Under the regulations, the Treasury Department determined
the status of an instrument as either debt or equity at the time of
issuance.145 All instruments treated as debt are treated as
indebtedness for all purposes of the Code unless specifically
recharacterized as equity.146 Debt obligations reclassified as equity
became preferred stock.147 The only instruments that could be
recharacterized as preferred stock are hybrid instruments148 and
straight debt instruments in certain enumerated circumstances.149
A purported debt instrument reclassified as preferred stock can
never be restored to the status of debt.150
D. Treatment of Straight Debt Instruments
The regulations defined straight debt instruments as any
instrument that is not a hybrid instrument.151 A corporation that
issued a straight debt instrument would treat it as indebtedness if
issued proportionately to the issuing corporation’s shareholders.152
There were five exceptions that reclassified a straight debt
instrument as preferred stock. First, if a corporation had excessive
debt.153 Second, if an instrument was not issued for money and did
144. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(2)(i) (1980).
145. Id. § 1.385-4(b)(1).
146. Id. § 1.385-4(c)(1).
147. Id.
148. See id. § 1.385-5(a) (issuing rules for the treatment of hybrid
instruments).
149. See id. § 1.385-6 (d), (f), (j), (k), (l) (describing the circumstances in which
a straight debt instrument will be reclassified as preferred stock).
150. Id.
151. Id. § 1.385-3(f).
152. Id. § 1.385-2(a)(1).
153. Id.; see also id. § 1.385-6(f)(1) (prescribing the general rules on how to
determine whether a corporation has excessive debt).
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not meet all the requirements of § 1.385-6(d).154 Third, if an
instrument was payable on demand but the stated annual rate of
interest was not reasonable.155 Fourth, if a corporation failed to pay
interest156 or failed to pay the principal when due.157 Lastly, if
there was a substantial change in the terms of the instrument.158
E. Treatment of Hybrid Instruments
Hybrid instruments were defined as “an instrument that is
convertible into stock or one (such as an income bond or a
participating bond) that provides for any contingent payment to
the holder (other than a call premium).”159 The regulations initially
characterized a hybrid instrument as equity if its fair market
value, excluding equity features, was less than fifty percent of its
actual fair market value, including equity features.160 If the issuer
and holder reasonably believed on the day of issue that the fair
market value of the instrument excluding its equity features was
below fifty percent of the actual fair market value including its
equity features, then the percentage becomes forty-five percent.161
Forty-five percent would be substituted for fifty percent only by a
showing of clear and convincing evidence.162 The regulations

154. Id. § 1.385-2(a)(1); see also id. § 1.385-6(d)(1), (3) (laying out when an
instrument not issued for money will be treated as stock).
155. Id. § 1.385-2(a)(1); see also id. § 1.385-6(l)(1), (2) (highlighting the
circumstances in which an instrument will initially be classified as stock and
when it will later be reclassified as stock).
156. Id. § 1.385-2(a)(1); see also id. § 1.385-6(k)(1) (imposing rules for when
the nonpayment of interest will result in a classification of an instrument as
stock).
157. Id. § 1.385-2(a)(1); see also id. § 1.385-6(l)(3) (detailing when an
instrument is considered payable on demand).
158. Id. § 1.385-2(a)(1). A substantial change in the terms of the instrument
are any changes that materially affect “the fair market value of the instrument.”
Id. § 1.385-6(j)(2).
159. Id. § 1.385-3(e).
160. Id. § 1.385-5(a).
161. Id. § 1.385-5(c).
162. Id.
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defined equity features as the right to contingent payments
(excluding the call premium)163 and convertibility to equity.164
F. The Substantial Proportionality Rules
The regulations provided seven tests to characterize
instruments as preferred stock when an instrument was issued in
substantial proportion to the holdings of common stock.165
Although the regulations do not define the term “substantial
proportionality,”
the
Treasury
Department
determined
substantial proportionality “from all relevant facts and
circumstances, including family or other relationships.”166 Section
318 of the I.R.C. defined family or other relationships as
relationships stemming from marriage, birth of a child (including
adopted children) or grandchild, parents, partnerships, estates,
trusts, and corporations.167 The proportionality rules do not apply
to a corporation’s stock and instruments that were widely held,
readily marketable, and separately traded,168 or to instruments
held by an independent creditor.169 Further, two or more classes of
instruments may be considered together depending on the facts
and circumstances.170
1. Tests One & Two: Hybrid Instruments & Instruments Not
Issued for Money
The first test is simple: if a corporation issued a hybrid
instrument in substantial proportion to stock, then the regulations

163. The regulations define contingent payment as “any payment other than
a fixed payment of principal or interest.” Id. § 1.385-5(d)(1).
164. Id. § 1.385-5(b).
165. See generally id. § 1.385-6.
166. Id. § 1.385-6(a)(2).
167. I.R.C. § 318(a) (2012).
168. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(3)(i) (1980).
169. Id. § 1.385-6(a)(3)(ii). An independent creditor is considered independent
depending on “all relevant facts and circumstances.” Id. § 1.385-6(b)(1).
170. Id. § 1.385-6(a)(4). For examples of the facts and circumstances that
would lead two instruments to be treated as one, see id. § 1.385-6(a)(4)(i), (ii).

2306

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2281 (2017)

treated the instrument as preferred stock.171 The second test is
more complex: if a corporation issues an instrument in exchange
for property other than cash, then the regulations treated the
instrument as preferred stock if two conditions were met.172 First,
the stated annual rate of interest was not reasonable.173 Second,
the issuance did not give rise to original issue discount under
§ 1232(a)(3) or amortizable bond premium under § 1.61-12(c)(2).174
There was an exception, however, for a corporation that issued an
instrument for an amount of consideration equal to or greater than
the principal amount175 of indebtedness of the issuing
corporation.176 Two requirements had to be met for the exception
to apply. First, an independent creditor exercising ordinary
diligence would agree to the exchange.177 Second, “[t]he issuing
corporation would, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, have
agreed to make the exchange with an independent creditor holding
the outstanding indebtedness.”178
2. Test Three: Excessive Debt
The regulations treated an instrument as preferred stock, if a
corporation with excessive debt issued an instrument in
substantial proportion to stock.179 The regulations find a
171. See id. § 1.385-6(c)(1) (“If this section applies to a hybrid instrument
immediately after it is issued, then the instrument is treated as stock.”); id.
§ 1.385-4(c)(1)(i) (explaining that an instrument recharacterized as stock is
treated as preferred stock).
172. See id. § 1.385-6(d)(1) (implementing rules pertaining to when an
instrument is issued in exchange for property); id. § 1.385-4(c)(1)(i) (“If an
instrument is treated as stock under section 385, then the instrument is treated
as preferred stock . . . .”).
173. Id. § 1.385-6(d)(1)(ii).
174. Id. § 1.385-6(d)(1)(iii).
175. The regulations explain that a principal amount of indebtedness includes
“interest accrued but unpaid up until the date of the exchange, but only to the
extent that such interest is paid with principal in the exchange.” Id.
§ 1.385-6(d)(3)(ii).
176. Id. § 1.385-6(d)(3)(i).
177. Id. § 1.385-6(d)(3)(i)(A).
178. Id. § 1.385-6(d)(3)(i)(B).
179. See id. § 1.385-6(f)(1) (laying forth how an instrument issued to a
corporation with excessive debt will be initially classified); id. § 1.385-4(c)(1)(i)
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corporation’s debt excessive if a bank, insurance company, or
similar lending institution would find the terms of the instrument
and the corporation’s financial structure unsatisfactory.180 A safe
harbor provision in the regulations holds that a corporation’s debt
is not excessive if two conditions are met regarding (1) the outside
ratio requirement and (2) the inside ratio requirement.181 First,
the corporation’s outside ratio had to be less than or equal to
10:1.182 A corporation’s outside ratio is determined by the debt-toequity ratio rules.183 Second, the corporation’s inside ratio had to
be less than or equal to 3:1.184 A corporation’s inside ratio was
determined in the same manner as a corporation’s outside ratio,185
but excluded liabilities to independent creditors.186
3. Test Four: Change in Terms of Outstanding Instruments
The regulations defined a substantial change in the terms of
an instrument as one that materially affected the fair market
value of the instrument.187 In general, if an instrument was
substantially proportional to the stock of the issuer on the day of
agreement188 and had a substantial change in the terms of the
instrument, the regulations treated the instrument as newly
issued in exchange for property on the day of agreement.189 The
amended terms are then tested under the substantial
(explicating the effects of characterizing an instrument as stock).
180. Id. § 1.385-6(f)(2)(i), (ii). “For this purpose, the corporation’s size,
industry, geographic location, and financial condition must be taken into
account.” Id. § 1.385-6(f)(2)(ii).
181. Id. § 1.385-6(f)(3).
182. Id. § 1.385-6(f)(3)(i).
183. See supra notes 131–133 (summarizing the debt-to-equity ratio rules).
184. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(3)(ii) (1980).
185. See supra notes 131–133 (summarizing the debt-to-equity ratio rules).
186. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(4). The regulations provide that in determining
stockholder’s equity, as part of the calculation to determine the inside ratio, a
corporation does not exclude liabilities. See id. § 1.385-6(f)(4).
187. Id. § 1.385-6(j)(2).
188. The regulations define “day of agreement” as “the day the issuer and the
holder enter into a binding contract to change the terms of an instrument.” Id.
§ 1.385-6(j)(3).
189. Id. § 1.385-6(j)(1)(iii).
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proportionality rules to determine whether the instrument should
be treated as equity or debt.190
4. Test Five: Nonpayment of Interest
The nonpayment of interest would convert a debt instrument
into preferred stock if the owner of the instrument failed to
exercise the ordinary diligence of an independent creditor and
failed to receive payment of all or part of the interest due and
payable during a taxable year.191 The regulations determined the
nonpayment of interest on the last day of the taxable year.192
Further, if the regulations converted a corporation’s purported
debt instrument into preferred stock, “then the instrument [was]
treated as stock beginning on the later of the first day of the
taxable year during which the failure to pay occur[ed] or the first
day on which this section applied to the instrument.”193
5. Tests Six & Seven: Demand Instruments & Nonpayment of
Principal
The regulations provided a two-part rule for the initial
classification of an instrument payable on demand. If a demand
instrument’s stated annual rate of interest was not reasonable194
and the demand instrument was issued in substantial proportion
to the company’s common stock,195 then it became preferred
stock.196 The regulations also provided rules for an instrument that
became payable on demand during the taxable year that are
similar to the rule that pertained to initial classification.197 The
190. See id. § 1.385-6 (outlining the seven tests under the substantial
proportionality rules).
191. Id. § 1.385-6(k)(1)(i), (ii).
192. Id. § 1.385-6(k)(1)(ii).
193. Id. § 1.385-6(k)(1)(iii).
194. Id. § 1.385-6(l)(iii).
195. Id. § 1.385-6(l)(ii).
196. Id. § 1.385-6(l)(iii); see also id. § 1.385-4(c)(1)(i) (revealing that if an
instrument is classified as stock then it is treated as preferred stock).
197. See id. § 1.385-6(l)(2) (setting forth the reclassification rules for
instruments payable on demand).
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only difference is that if it is reclassified, the regulations treated
the reclassified instrument as issued at the start (or a portion) of
that taxable year.198 If an issuing corporation failed to make a
scheduled payment of principal within ninety days after the
payment was due and if the holder of the instrument failed to
exercise the ordinary diligence of an independent creditor, then the
instrument would be considered to be payable on demand.199 The
regulations determined an instrument subject to this rule to be
“payable on demand beginning on the day after the day the
principal was due.”200
G. Treatment of Unwritten Obligations
In general, the regulations treated unwritten obligations,
obligations not evidenced by a written instrument within six
months after the day the loan is made,201 differently than
instruments evidenced by a writing. The rules that pertained to
the treatment of unwritten obligations did not apply to
independent creditors and excluded loans repaid within six
months, but only if the outstanding balance, reduced by the
outstanding balance of prior qualifying loans, did not exceed
$25,000.202 If not excluded, the regulations treated an unwritten
obligation as indebtedness.203 Further, if a corporation issued an
unwritten obligation and had excessive debt,204 the regulations
treated it as a contribution to capital.205 Moreover, if the debtor
corporation failed to make a payment of interest on the loan at a
reasonable rate of interest,206 the regulations reclassified the loan

198. Id. § 1.385-6(l)(2)(iii).
199. Id. § 1.385-6(l)(3)(i), (ii).
200. Id. § 1.385-6(l)(3)(ii).
201. Id. § 1.385-7(a)(1)(ii).
202. Id. § 1.385-7(a)(2)(i).
203. See id. § 1.385-7(a)(2)(ii) (“[A] loan to which this section applies is treated
as indebtedness.”).
204. For a definition of excessive debt, see supra note 180 and accompanying
text.
205. Id. § 1.385-7(b)(2).
206. For a definition of reasonable rate of interest, see supra notes 142–144
and accompanying text.
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as a contribution to capital.207 Any unwritten obligation that was
treated as a contribution to capital under these rules would be
treated as a distribution of property under I.R.C. § 301.208 Under
I.R.C. § 301, the Treasury Department taxed any unwritten
obligation on “that portion of the distribution that [was] not a
dividend, to the extent that it exceed[ed] the adjusted basis of the
stock.”209 As such, § 301 treated it “as a gain from the sale or
exchange of property.”210
H. Treatment of Guaranteed Loans
Relevant legal principles still applied to a corporation that
incurred a loan guaranteed by a shareholder.211 Further, if a court
treated such a loan as made by the shareholder under relevant
legal principles, then the common law treated the shareholder as
having made a contribution to capital of the corporation.212
I. Treatment of Preferred Stock
The regulations treated preferred stock in one of two ways:
(1) as equity if there were no fixed principal or interest payments;
213 or (2) as debt if there were.214 Preferred stock classified as
indebtedness was subject to the rules under the treatment of
instruments generally, unless classified as equity. Therefore,
under the regulations, preferred stock was subject to the hybrid
instruments rules or the proportionality rules.215
207. Id. § 1.385-7(c)(1).
208. Id. § 1.385-7(d) (describing the effect of a corporation’s failure to pay
reasonable interest on a loan).
209. I.R.C. § 301 (c)(3)(A) (2012).
210. Id.
211. See id. § 1.385-9(a) (laying out the various rules for guaranteed loans).
212. See id. § 1.385-9(a)(2) (conveying that guaranteed loans will be
determined under relevant legal principles “applied without reference to the
regulations under section 385”).
213. Id. § 1.385-10(a).
214. Id.
215. See id. (explicating the rules under which preferred stock can be
classified as indebtedness).

THE DEBT-EQUITY LABYRINTH

2311

The rules for the treatment of preferred stock also set forth a
rule of convenience that treated preferred stock as equity, but only
if six conditions were met.216 First, the preferred stock was
denominated preferred stock and treated as preferred stock under
non-tax law.217 Second, the surplus of the preferred stock’s
redemption price over its issue price was a reasonable redemption
premium under § 1.305-5.218 Third, the preferred stock’s current
dividends were contingent.219 Fourth, rights to receive dividend
and redemption payments of preferred stock were not enforced
under non-tax law because the issuing corporation was insolvent,
would be rendered insolvent by making such payments, or because
making those payments would impair the issuing corporation’s
capital.220 Fifth, a default on dividend or redemption payment of
preferred stock would not accelerate redemption payments at the
election of the holder.221 Sixth, there was at least a ten-year
limitation during which the holder was not allowed to compel
redemption.222 This brief summary of the 1980 regulations
illustrates why they were dropped after voluminous criticism: they
were unduly complex and attempted to address every potential
permutation, they were too rigid in places, and in other cases they
failed to address real-world complexities.
VI. The 2016 Approach
A. Background
On April 8, 2016, the Treasury Department issued proposed
regulations under § 385.223 This time, the Treasury Department
sought to provide rules to determine the true nature of an interest

216. See id. § 1.385-10(b) (providing the rule of convenience).
217. Id. § 1.385-10(b)(1).
218. Id. § 1.385-10(b)(2)
219. Id. § 1.385-10(b)(3).
220. Id. § 1.385-10(b)(4).
221. Id. § 1.385-10(b)(5).
222. Id. § 1.385-10(b)(6).
223. See generally Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-4, 81 Fed. Reg. 20912
(Apr. 8, 2016).
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in a corporation.224 On October 21, 2016, the Treasury Department
finalized the proposed regulations in an unusually rapid pace of
adoption.225 The regulations apply to expanded group instruments
(EGI) and instruments issued by members of an expanded group
that are domestic corporations.226 An EGI is generally defined as
an instrument denominated as debt (regardless of its ultimate
characterization by the I.R.S.) that one member of an “expanded
group” issued to another member.227 An expanded group “generally
includes all corporations connected to a common parent that owns,
directly or indirectly, 80% of the vote or value of each such
corporation.”228
Excluded
from
these
regulations
are
S-corporations, non-controlled regulated investment companies,
real estate investment trusts, partnerships and certain specified
financial entities, financial groups, insurance companies,229 and
qualified short term debt instruments.230 Further, taxpayers
subject to these regulations are entitled to exclude the first $50
million of debt that is otherwise recharacterized as equity.231

224. See id. (noting that the absence of regulations under § 385 resulted in
courts applying inconsistent sets of factors).
225. Compare id. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-4 (proposing regulations under § 385 on
April 8, 2016), with Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1–1.385-3T (2016) (finalizing regulations
under § 385 on October 21, 2016).
226. See id. § 1.385-2(a)(3) (stipulating which instruments are subject to the
documentation requirements).
227. Id. § 1.385-2(d)(3).
228. DELOITTE, FINAL/TEMPORARY REGULATIONS ADDRESS TREATMENT OF
CERTAIN INTERESTS IN CORPORATIONS AS STOCK OR INDEBTEDNESS 2 (2016),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/Tax/us-tax-alertnew-section-385-regulations.pdf; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1(c)(4)(i) (2016)
(giving a definition of expanded group).
229. See id. § 1.385-3(c) (excluding certain types of companies from the scope
of these rules).
230. The regulations contain a full section on rules pertaining to qualified
short-term debt obligations, but because those rules are beyond the scope of this
Note, they are not discussed in depth. For more information on qualified
short-term debt instruments, see id. § 1.385-3T (exempting qualified short-term
debt instruments).
231. See id. § 1.385-3(c)(4) (excluding the first $50 million of debt a
corporation issues).
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B. Documentation Rules
1. Scope
The rules set forth an explicit set of documentation
requirements that must be followed to avoid the characterization
of certain instruments as debt rather than equity.232 The purpose
of the documentation requirements is twofold. First, it provides the
Treasury Department with the ability to make a proper
determination as to whether an instrument is debt or equity by
providing guidance on the necessary documentation and
information a corporation must prepare, maintain, and provide to
the I.R.S.233 Second, it establishes “operating rules, presumptions,
and factors to be taken into account” in making a proper
determination under the regulations.234
The regulations point out that compliance alone with this
section will not deem an instrument debt, but failure to maintain
this documentation may disqualify an instrument from debt
status.235 The documentation rules require a corporation to
maintain “complete copies of all instruments, agreements,
subordination agreements, and other documents evidencing the
material rights and obligations of the issuer and holder relating to
the EGI.”236 A corporation must prepare these records by the time
that the issuer’s federal income tax return is filed.237
The application of the documentation requirements to an
expanded group instrument is limited based on certain
qualifications. First, this Section only covers an expanded group
instrument if it is issued to a covered member.238 Second, this
Section applies to an expanded group instrument only if it meets
any of three threshold requirements: (1) the stock by any member
232. See id. § 1.385-2(a)(1) (providing documentation requirements).
233. Id. § 1.385-2(a)(2).
234. Id.
235. See id. (revealing that compliance with the documentation rules only
serves to “satisfy the minimum documentation for the determination to be made”).
236. Id. § 1.385-2(c)(1)(i).
237. Id. § 1.385-2(c)(4)(i).
238. A covered member is regarded as a “member of an expanded group that
is . . . a domestic corporation” or a disregarded entity as defined in § 1.385-1(c)(3).
Id. § 1.385-1(c)(2).
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of the expanded group is traded on an established financial
market, (2) total assets of the issuing corporation exceed $100
million, or (3) annual total revenue of the issuing corporation
exceeds $50 million.239
2. The Per Se Rule and Rebuttable Presumption
Under the Documentation Rules, there is a per se rule that
characterizes an expanded group instrument as equity if a
corporation fails to prepare, maintain, and provide the appropriate
documents and does not qualify for an exception.240 A rebuttable
presumption from per se treatment exists if the corporation can
clearly show under common law factors that the expanded group
instrument is debt.241 The rebuttable presumption only applies
where a corporation has a high percentage of expanded group
instruments (other than the one at issue) that comply with the
documentation requirements.242 For an expanded group to make
this showing, one of two requirements must be met.
First, the average total adjusted issue price of all expanded
group instruments at the close of each quarter that are
undocumented and outstanding must be less than ten percent of
the average amount of the total adjusted issue price of all expanded
group instruments outstanding at the end of the taxable year.243
Second, in the alternative, no expanded group instrument that is
undocumented is determined to have an issue price in excess of
either $100 million or in the alternative $25 million; a corporation
can meet the requirement under either determination.244 A
corporation meets the $100 million test if the number of
undocumented and outstanding expanded group instruments
averaged at the close of each quarter is less than five percent of
all averaged expanded group instruments that are outstanding at

239. Id. § 1.385-2(a)(3)(ii).
240. Id. § 1.385-2(b)(1).
241. Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(A).
242. See id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(B) (requiring corporations to meet this threshold
requirement in order to claim that a rebuttable presumption exists).
243. Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(B)(1).
244. Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(B)(2).
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the end of the taxable year.245 A corporation meets the $25 million
test if the number of undocumented and outstanding expanded
group instruments averaged at the close of each quarter is less
than ten percent of all averaged expanded group instruments that
are outstanding at the end of the taxable year.246 Moreover, under
the Anti-Stuffing Rule, manipulation of adjusted issue prices of
expanded group instruments is discounted in making this
determination.247 When making this determination, the Treasury
Department may find reasonable cause for a corporation’s failure
to adhere to the documentation requirements.248 An expanded
group member who fails to prepare the required documents and
seeks redress must prepare those documents within a reasonable
time and maintain those documents.249
3. Indebtedness Factors
Within an expanded group instrument’s documentation, the
regulations set forth certain criteria a corporation must meet to
satisfy the documentation requirements. First, there must be a
written unconditional and legal obligation by the issuer to pay a
determinable sum on demand or on a specific date.250 Second, there
must be written documentation that establishes the creditor’s
right to enforce the obligation.251 Third, there must be written
documentation that there is a reasonable expectation that, on the
date of issuance, the issuer’s financial position creates a
reasonable expectation that the issuer intends to repay the debt.252
Fourth, subsequent to the issuance of the note, the parties must
behave in a manner consistent with a debtor-creditor
relationship.253 It should be noted that the reasonable expectation
requirement and consistent behavior requirements are more in the
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(B)(2)(i).
Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(B)(2)(ii).
Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(B)(4).
Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(C)(ii)(A).
Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(i)(C)(ii)(B).
Id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(i).
Id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(ii).
Id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iii).
Id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iv).
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nature of substantive than procedural requirements; merely
documenting a loan may not rise to the level of a genuine belief in
repayment ability or genuine conduct as a debtor or a creditor.254
C. Recharacterization Rule
1. Scope
The Recharacterization Rules are intended to address
situations in which a covered debt instrument is issued to a related
person that does not result in a new investment in the operations
of the issuing corporation.255 Under the Recharacterization Rules,
the Treasury Department treats a debt instrument as equity if it
is described by the General Rule, does not fall under one of the
exceptions of the Funding Rule, and is not subject to the
Anti-Abuse Rule.256 As a result, the Recharacterization Rule
operates “to recast a debt instrument into [equity] if: (i) a member
of the expanded group issues the instrument in a tainted
transaction to another member of the expanded group; or (ii) the
instrument is deemed to fund the tainted transaction.”257 Once a
covered debt is treated as equity, the regulations specify its
continued treatment as equity for all federal tax purposes.258

254. See id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iii) (identifying what it means to have a reasonable
expectation of repayment); id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iv) (clarifying that to meet the
creditor-debtor relationship requirement there must be a showing of payments of
principal and interest along with enforcement and non-enforcement of creditor’s
rights).
255. Id. § 1.385-3(a).
256. Id.
257. ERNST & YOUNG LLP, FINAL AND TEMPORARY US SECTION 385
REGULATIONS SIGNIFICANTLY NARROW SCOPE OF EARLIER PROPOSED REGULATIONS
6 (2016), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Final_and_temporary_
US_Section_385_regulations_significantly_narrow_the_scope_of_earlier
_proposed_regulations/$FILE/2016US_03460-161US_Final%20and%20temp%
20US%20Sec%20385%20regs%20significantly%20narrow%20scope%20of%20ear
lier%20proposed%20regs%20GL.pdf [hereinafter FINAL AND TEMPORARY
REGULATIONS].
258. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(1) (2016).
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2. General Rule
The General Rule specifies three types of transactions that the
Treasury Department will characterize as equity when a
corporation issues a covered debt instrument to a member of its
expanded group. The first is a distribution.259 The second is an
exchange for expanded group stock that is not an exempt
exchange.260 The third is an exchange for property in an asset
reorganization, but only if a shareholder in the transferor
corporation that is also a member of the issuer’s expanded group
receives “immediately before the reorganization the covered debt
instrument with respect to its stock in the transferor
corporation.”261
3. Funding Rule
The Funding Rule was put in place “to prevent taxpayers from
achieving in multiple steps what the General Rule prevents
taxpayers from achieving in one step.”262 Under the Funding Rule,
a funded member263 who issues a debt instrument to an expanded
group member may have that debt instrument treated as equity if
the principal purpose of funding that transaction is similar to the
transactions described in the General Rule.264 A per se rule under
the Funding Rule deems any debt instrument (other than certain
instruments issued both in the ordinary course of business and in
connection with the purchase of property or services in non-capital
transactions) as equity if a corporation issued the instrument
during the period beginning thirty-six months before and ending
259. Id. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(i).
260. Id. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(ii).
261. Id. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(iii).
262. FINAL AND TEMPORARY REGULATIONS, supra note 257, at 6.
263. A “funded member” is defined as a covered member that makes: (1) a
distribution with respect to stock, (2) in exchange for “expanded group” stock
(with limited exceptions for exempt exchanges), or (3) in exchange for property in
an internal restructuring that is treated as an asset reorganization for U.S.
federal income tax purposes (including an “A,” “C,” “D,” “F,” or “G”
reorganization). Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(3)(i) (2016).
264. See id. § 1.385-3(b)(3)(i)(A), (B), (C) (laying forth the identical
transactions).
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thirty-six months after the date of a distribution or acquisition
described in the General Rule.265
4. Anti-Abuse Rule
The Anti-Abuse Rule prevents a corporation from treating an
instrument as debt if the instrument was issued to avoid the
Anti-Abuse Rule or the rules for qualified short-term debt
instruments.266 The Anti-Abuse Rule exempts an acquisition of
expanded group stock from the General Rule or Funding Rule if
one condition is met:
[T]he member of the expanded group from which the expanded
group stock is acquired, and the acquirer does not relinquish
control of the seller pursuant to a plan that existed on the date
of the acquisition, other than in a transaction in which the seller
ceases to be a member of the expanded group of which the
acquirer is a member.267

Control of a corporation is defined as owning, directly or
indirectly, more than fifty percent of the voting power of all classes
of stock and more than fifty percent of the total value of the stock
of the corporation.268 Under the exception, there is a presumption
that the acquirer of the expanded group stock has a plan to
relinquish control to the seller within a thirty-six month period
after the acquisition date.269 This presumption may be rebutted
only by clearly showing that the loss of control was neither
contemplated on the date of acquisition, nor meant to avoid the
Recharacterization Rules.270

265. Id. § 1.385-3(b)(3)(iii)(A).
266. Id. § 1.385-3(b)(4). For a list of non-exhaustive examples to transactions
that the Anti-Abuse Rule may apply, see id. § 1.385-3(b)(4)(i), (ii).
267. Id. § 1.385-3(c)(2)(i)(A).
268. Id. § 1.385-3(c)(2)(i)(B).
269. Id. § 1.385-3(c)(2)(i)(C).
270. Id.
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VII. Analyzing the Common Law Approach, the 1980 Regulations,
and the 2016 Regulations
To analyze the approaches followed by the common law and
the 1980 and 2016 regulations, it is instructive to look at a set of
examples of the types of transactions multinational corporations
might enter into today. The first example is a straightforward loan
from a wholly owned subsidiary to a parent company.271 The second
example is a more complex convertible loan from a large
shareholder to a corporation.272 The third is a loan extended in
exchange for property by a troubled company to a large
shareholder (Company A).273 In all cases, we assume that the loan
is documented by a written contract. For purposes of the 2016
regulations, we assume that the loans in question constitute an
EGI,274 the total assets of the corporation exceed $100 million,275
the corporation satisfies the documentation rules with respect to
the loan,276 and each corporation already excluded the first $50
million of debt that is otherwise covered.277
A. Example 1: Traditional Loan
Company A borrows $250 million from its wholly owned
subsidiary Company B. Company A is a multinational corporation
with a book value of $1 billion and a public market capitalization
of $5 billion. The loan is documented in a note that sets forth the
271. See infra Part VII.A (analyzing a traditional loan under the common law,
1980 regulations, and 2016 regulations).
272. See infra Part VII.B (examining the determination of a convertible loan
as either debt or equity under the common law, 1980 regulations, and 2016
regulations).
273. See infra Part VII.C (evaluating whether a troubled company loan should
be characterized as debt or equity under the common law, 1980 regulations, and
2016 regulations).
274. See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text (defining and describing
what constitutes an EGI).
275. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2(a)(ii) (2016) (requiring a corporation to meet
one of three threshold requirements to be subjected to the documentation rules).
276. See id. § 1.385-2(b)(1) (treating a corporation’s instrument as equity if it
fails to properly document and maintain certain documents).
277. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (describing the $50 million
exclusion).
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terms (Note 1). Note 1 is due in five years and pays interest at the
rate of seven percent per annum on a semiannual basis in arrears.
The debt is ranked pari passu with the company’s bank debt and
senior to its subordinated debt and common stock. In the event of
non-payment, there is a thirty-day grace period after which the
loan is declared in default. Company B has traditional creditor’s
remedies, including the right to sue Company A for payment.
1. Common Law Analysis
Under the common law analysis, which looks at the four
corners of the Note, the intent of the parties to establish a debt
instrument is clear.278 Company B is vested with traditional
creditors rights: interest payments are mandatory,279 Company B
has the right to demand payment and sue for non-payment,280 the
loan has a set maturity date,281 the loan ranks senior to the
company’s equity and subordinated debt,282 and the company’s
financial condition at the time the loan was extended makes it
reasonable to expect repayment at maturity.283
2. 1980 Regulations
Under the 1980 regulations, the Note meets the test of a debt
instrument; it does not possess any of the attributes of a hybrid
instrument that gives rise to analysis creating potential
characterization as preferred stock.284 Issues regarding the fair
278. See supra notes 75–102 and accompanying text (identifying and
explaining the common law factors that bear on an objective determination of an
intent to create a debtor-creditor relationship).
279. See supra notes 71, 92–93 and accompanying text (discussing the weight
of interest payments in making a determination of debt or equity treatment).
280. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 420 (explaining that the right to force
payment upon default supports a finding of equity treatment).
281. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text (noting the value of having
a fixed maturity date).
282. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (establishing the importance
of subordination).
283. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text (detailing the significance
of a corporation’s failure to enforce a default).
284. See supra notes 151–158 and accompanying text (summarizing the
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market value of the instrument,285 the debt equity ratio,286 or the
reasonable rate of interest are all satisfied.287
3. 2016 Regulations
Under the new 2016 regulations, which corporations now must
satisfy, the Note is considered debt. To determine whether the
Note is equity under the Recharacterization Rules issued in 2016,
the Note must fall within either the General Rule or the Funding
Rule and avoid capture by the Anti-Abuse rule.288 Under the
General Rule, the regulations characterize a debt instrument as
equity if it was issued by a corporation to a member of the
corporation’s “expanded group”289 (a) in a distribution with respect
to stock; (b) in exchange for “expanded group” stock (with limited
exceptions for exempt exchanges); or (c) in exchange for property
in an internal restructuring that is treated as an asset
reorganization for U.S. federal income tax purposes (including an
“A”, “C”, “D”, “F”, or “G” reorganization.).290 In this case, Company
A and B are part of an “expanded group” but the loan does not fall
under any of the transactions described in the General Rule;
therefore, the Note is not recharacterized as equity. Further, under
the Funding Rule, the regulations reclassify a debt instrument as
equity to the extent a corporation issued it to a member of the
funded member’s “expanded group” in exchange for property.291
Again, because Company A and B are members of an “expanded
treatment of straight debt instruments).
285. See supra notes 118–127 and accompanying text (revealing how a
determination of the fair market value of an instrument is necessary).
286. See supra notes 128–134 and accompanying text (describing how a
determination of a corporation’s debt-to-equity ratio is needed for a proper
evaluation).
287. See supra notes 138–144 and accompanying text (clarifying the
importance of a proper determination of a reasonable rate of interest).
288. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) (2016) (presenting how the
Recharacterization Rules operate).
289. See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text (defining “expanded
group”).
290. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2) (2016) (providing the various transactions
that fall under the general rule).
291. See supra notes 262–265 and accompanying text (examining the Funding
Rule).
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group” but the loan does fall under any of the transactions
described in the Funding Rule, recharacterization of the
instrument does not occur.
B. Example 2: Convertible Loan
Company A borrows $250 million from its largest shareholder,
XYZ Hedge Fund, which owns ten percent of its common stock and
appointed two of the company’s seven directors. The terms of the
loan (Note 2) are as follows: (1) the loan is convertible into ten
percent of the company’s common stock if the stock reaches a price
of $25 per share (it is trading at $10 per share at the time the loan
is made), (2) it pays interest at three percent per year
semiannually in arrears, (3) interest can be paid in cash or by the
issuance of additional bonds at the option of the company, (4) it
matures in five years, and (5) the lender is given traditional
remedies upon default. To illustrate the ability to pay interest via
issuance of additional bonds, the company can choose to make the
semiannual interest payment of $3.75 million (3% x $250,000,000
x 6 months) by issuing an additional $3.75 million face amount of
bonds with the same terms as the Note rather than paying cash.
The loan ranks senior to the company’s equity and pari passu with
its subordinated debt, but is subordinated to its senior debt (this is
traditional for convertible debt instruments). There is a thirty-day
grace period for interest payments, after which XYZ Hedge Fund
can assert its rights as a creditor. Company A is solvent and
otherwise financially sound at the time the loan is made.
1. Common Law Analysis
While a convertible note is a hybrid instrument possessing the
attributes of both equity and debt,292 Note 2 should be treated as a
debt instrument prior to the time of conversion (if ever) into stock.
292. See David Newton, Understanding Convertible Loans, ENTREPRENEUR
(Oct. 28, 2002), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/56512 (last visited Feb. 28,
2017) (“Typically, the conversion feature [of a convertible loan] gives the lender
an option to convert all or a portion of the outstanding principal of the loan into
some form of an equity position in the borrower’s company.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Traditional creditors’ rights vest with Company B: interest
payments are mandatory,293 Company B has the right to demand
payment and sue for non-payment,294 the loan has a set maturity
date,295 the loan ranks senior to the company’s equity and pari
passu with its subordinated debt,296 and the company’s financial
condition at the time the loan was extended makes it reasonable to
expect repayment at maturity.297
2. 1980 Regulations
The 1980 regulations raise unnecessary confusion regarding
the treatment of this Note. Until the Note is converted or
Company A defaults, this Note appears to meet the definition of a
“hybrid instrument” under these regulations: “[a]n instrument
that is convertible into stock or one (such as an income bond or a
participating bond) that provides for any contingent payment to
the holder (other than a call premium).”298 A hybrid instrument
is treated as equity on the day of issuance if the fair market value
of the instrument excluding its equity features is less than fifty
percent of the actual fair market value of the instrument including
its equity features.299 In this case, however, because XYZ Hedge
Fund is financially sound, it is unlikely that more than fifty
percent of the value of the Note is attributable to its equity
component, and therefore, the Note should not be recharacterized
as equity. Further, Company A did not issue the Note
proportionately to the common stock, and therefore, it would not
293. See supra notes 71, 92–93 and accompanying text (observing the various
weight interest payments have received under the common law).
294. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 420 (“The ‘right to force payment of the sum
as a debt in the event of default’ is a very significant, if not essential factor.”
(quoting United States v. S. Ga. Ry., 107 F. Supp. 382, 395 (N.D. Ohio (1968))).
295. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text (establishing the
significance of having a fixed maturity date).
296. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (describing the weight courts
have given subordination under a common law multi-factored analysis).
297. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text (specifying the
consequences of a corporation’s failure to enforce a default).
298. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(e) (1980).
299. See id. § 1.385-5(a) (setting forth the initial classification rules for hybrid
instruments).
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implicate the tests under the regulations that would lead to its
becoming preferred stock.300 Finally, Company A is not an
excessively leveraged company issuing an instrument
proportionately to its common stock, so again, the Note is not
subject to recharacterization as preferred stock.301 The regulations
introduce significant and unnecessary complexity into the
analysis.
3. 2016 Regulations
Under the new 2016 regulations, Note 2 is also considered
debt. Under the General Rule,302 Company A and XYZ Hedge Fund
are not considered part of an “expanded group,”303 and therefore,
the regulations do not recharacterize the Note as equity. Further,
under the Funding Rule,304 Company A and XYZ Hedge Fund also
are not members of an “expanded group,”305 and therefore, no
recharacterization of the instrument occurs. Regarding the
documentation requirements, it appears that there was a
reasonable expectation of repayment at the time the loan was
extended and the parties appear to be maintaining an arm’s length
debtor-creditor relationship in their commercial relationship as
stockholder/corporation.306 Application of the new regulations
produces the correct result, i.e., treatment of Note 2 as debt.

300. See supra Part IV.F (supplying the substantial proportionality rules).
301. See supra Section IV.F.2 (elaborating on the excessive debt test under
the substantial proportionality rules).
302. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2) (2016) (setting forth the transactions that
are subject to the general rule).
303. See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text (providing a definition
for expanded group).
304. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(3)(i) (2016) (indexing the transactions to
which the Funding Rule applies).
305. See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text (establishing the
definition for “expanded group”).
306. See supra notes 232–239 and accompanying text (outlining the
documentation requirements necessary to support a finding of debt treatment).
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C. Example 3: Distressed Company Loan
Company A is in financial distress. It is running out of cash to
fund its payroll and is at risk of filing for bankruptcy unless it can
obtain immediate funding. It borrows $100 million from its largest
shareholder (Note 3), Vulture Hedge Fund (Vulture), which invests
in distressed companies. Vulture has accumulated a thirty-five
percent stake in Company A over the last few months at very low
stock prices because the market knows that the company is in
trouble. Vulture drives a very hard bargain. It agrees to lend
Company A the money only on the following terms: a one-year loan
secured by all of Company A’s real estate at a rate of ten percent
(the Prime Rate is one percent) payable monthly convertible into
seventy-five percent of Company A’s stock in the event of default;
interest is payable monthly with a five-day grace period after
which Vulture can demand immediate payment; Vulture gets
three of Company A’s seven board seats now and two more board
seats upon default; and Vulture gets access to monthly financial
reports from the company. The loan ranks senior to all of
Company’s A existing debt and equity. Having no alternative,
Company A agrees to the deal.
1. Common Law Analysis
Note 3 highlights the shortcomings of the common law
approach to the debt/equity issue. Under the common law analysis,
looking at the four corners of the agreement leads to the conclusion
that this is a debt instrument. It appears from Note 3 that the
parties intended to establish a debt instrument. Vulture is
invested with traditional creditor’s rights: interest payments are
mandatory,307 Vulture has the right to demand payment and sue
for non-payment,308 the loan has a set maturity date,309 and the
307. See supra notes 69–71, 92–93 and accompanying text (pointing out the
various ways courts have dealt with interest payments).
308. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 420 (evaluating the treatment of remedies
for default).
309. See id. at 413 (“The most important of the formal factors is a provision
for a fixed . . . time when the purported creditor is unconditionally entitled to
require payment of the principal.”).
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loan ranks senior to the company’s debt and equity.310 But the
company is on the verge of insolvency, so regardless of what the
company intended, it may not be realistic to expect repayment of
the loan in cash. Instead, a more reasonable expectation may be
repayment through conversion of the loan to equity, and an award
of two more board seats and effective control of the company to
Vulture. Accordingly, the common law approach falls short in this
distressed loan situation because courts limited their analysis to
the four corners of a debt contract which omits important facts
regarding the company’s financial condition, leading them to weigh
factors in these types of situations without regard to commercial
realities.311
2. 1980 Regulations
Surprisingly, the much-maligned 1980 regulations may work
best in this type of situation where a hybrid instrument is used to
bail out a financially troubled company. Application of the
preliminary three-part test analyzing the fair market value of the
instrument, the debt-to-equity ratio, and the reasonable rate of
interest on the loan leads to the conclusion that Note 3 should be
treated as equity rather than as debt.312 This test highlights the
reality that Note 3 is likely worth far less than face value at the
time Vulture extended the loan because much of the proceeds will
likely be used to pay arrearages on payables and other obligations
of the company to keep it operating.313 The company’s
debt-to-equity ratio is also likely to be extremely elevated,
suggesting that the new funds invested should be treated as equity
because they are at high risk of not being repaid.314 The 1980
310. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (elaborating on the significance
of subordination).
311. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 408 (asserting that the courts “arrive at
opposite results on identical facts” depending on which factors they wish to
stress).
312. See supra Part IV.B and accompanying text (explicating the importance
of the preliminary rules).
313. See supra Part IV.B.1 and accompanying text (exploring the treatment
of an instrument deemed to have a fair market value).
314. See supra Part IV.B.2 and accompanying text (disclosing the effect in
determining the reasonableness of a company’s debt-to-equity ratio).
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Regulations would likely treat Note 3 as equity, a sound result in
view of the likelihood that Vulture will end up with control over
most of the stock and the company’s board in a relatively short
period of time.
3. 2016 Regulations
Under the new 2016 regulations, the determination whether
Note 3 should be considered debt or equity likely comes down to an
application of the documentation requirements, rather than the
Distributed Debt Rules.315 To determine whether Note 3 is equity
under the Distributed Debt Rules, it must fall within either the
General Rule or the Funding Rule.316 Technically, under the
General Rule,317 Company A and Vulture are not considered part
of an “expanded group,”318 and therefore, Note 3 would not be
recharacterized as equity. Further, under the Funding Rule, a debt
instrument is considered equity to the extent a corporation issued
the instrument to a member of the funded member’s “expanded
group”319 in exchange for property in a tax-free internal
organization because while the Note is secured by Company A’s
property, no property has changed hands yet.320 But the
documentation requirements create an additional hurdle that may
cause Note 3 to be recharacterized as equity, nonetheless. Due to
Company A’s dire financial condition, the I.R.S. could reasonably
find that there was not a reasonable expectation of repayment at
the time the loan was extended.321 The Treasury Department could
315. Compare supra Part VI.C (describing the Recharacterization Rules),
with supra Part VI.B (stating the Documentation Rules).
316. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) (2016) (summarizing how the
Recharacterization Rules operate).
317. See id. § 1.385-3(b)(2) (supplying the transactions to which the General
Rule applies).
318. See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text (defining “expanded
group”).
319. See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text (giving a definition for
expanded group).
320. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(3)(i)(C) (2016) (providing that the funding
rule applies to transactions in which a funded member in an asset reorganization
acquires property).
321. See id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iii) (“There must be written documentation
containing information establishing that, as of the date of issuance . . . and taking
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find that certain terms of the loan, such as the board
representation and provision of monthly financial reports to
Vulture, are not characteristic of a normal debtor-creditor
relationship.322 These findings could fail to meet the
documentation requirements and lead the I.R.S. to find that the
Note should be treated as equity and not debt.323 In this case that
may well prove to be the correct result.
VIII. A Case for the 2016 Regulations
In the first two examples, the common law approach, the 1980
regulations, and the 2016 regulations all end up in the same
position in terms of characterizing an instrument.324 This
consistency disappears in example three.325 The troubled company
loan example provides insight into the strengths of the 2016
regulations.326
In fashioning a regulatory approach that balances the need to
provide corporations with clarity and flexibility and the
government with appropriate tools to fight tax abuse, the
government adopted the 2016 Regulations. The 2016 Regulations
give broad discretion to the I.R.S. to recharacterize debt as equity
in circumstances where the economic reality does not support a
showing that repayment of an instrument denominated as debt is
likely or where the parties do not appear to conduct themselves as
arm’s length debtors and creditors.327 Moreover, the 2016
regulations eschew the ambiguity of the common law approach, as
into account all relevant circumstances . . . the issuer’s financial position
supported a reasonable expectation that the issuer intended to, and would be able
to, meet its obligations . . . .”).
322. See id. § 1.385-2(c)(iv) (informing the taxpayer of the documentation that
must be provided in order to prove a debtor-creditor relationship existed).
323. See id. § 1.385-2(a)(2) (“[C]ompliance with this section does not establish
that an interest is indebtedness; it serves only to satisfy the minimum
documentation for the determination to be made under general federal tax
principles.”).
324. See supra Parts VII.A–B (supplying and analyzing examples).
325. See supra Part VII.C (comparing the results under the common law, the
1980 regulations, and the 2016 regulations).
326. See supra Part VI.C.3 (analyzing the result under the 2016 regulations).
327. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2(c)(2) (2016) (establishing the indebtedness
factors under the documentation requirements).
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well as the specificity provided in the 1980 regulations, in favor of
a more intent-based inquiry to prevent parties from engaging in
tax avoidance transactions through use of complex corporate
finance techniques.328 Years of aggressive tax practice by
corporations, intended to elevate form over substance and make it
as difficult as possible for the I.R.S. to challenge transactions
designed to turn equity into debt and to confer the tax benefits
associated with debt on de facto related parties, necessitated such
an approach.329
It was long apparent that giving a financial instrument one or
more of the formal indicia of debt as set forth in the common law
tests (e.g., a maturity date, an interest rate, a senior ranking, etc.)
was an exercise in elevating form over substance.330 This is true
particularly in cases where the borrower’s financial condition
renders repayment unlikely, or when extension or terms of the
loan ultimately confer corporate control on the lender
(intentionally or not).331 Even where a party owns less than eighty
percent of a borrower or controls less than eighty percent of the
seats on the board of directors,332 it may as a practical matter own
a sufficient amount of stock or control enough board seats to
exercise de facto control of the company even if the relationship
between the parties falls outside the definition of an expanded

328. Compare supra Part IV (describing the common law approach), with
supra Part V (outlining the 1980 regulations), and supra Part VI (exploring the
2016 regulations).
329. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Just Say No: Corporate Taxation and
Corporate Social Responsibility 19 (Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper
No. 14-010, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2423045
(stating that there is an increase in aggressive tax behavior among corporations).
330. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (revealing that courts
developed multi-factored test to help determine whether an instrument should be
treated as debt or equity).
331. Sears, for example, took a $425 million loan from Edward Lampert (a
sixteen percent shareholder in Sears) through his hedge fund. See Gara, supra
note 4 (mentioning that amount of loans Sears has taken from Lampert).
Although Lampert does not own eighty percent of Sears’ vote or value, Lampert,
through his loans,“secured by a junior liens against Sears’ inventory, receivables
and working capital,” and his sixteen percent ownership stake in Sears, gives him
de facto control. Id.
332. See supra notes 226–229 and accompanying text (laying out that the
regulations apply to expanded group instruments).
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group.333 This is particularly true in distressed situations like
Company A, where Vulture Hedge Fund owns substantial equity,
controls several board seats, and extends a substantial loan that
gives it payment priority ahead of common shareholders. In the
real world, such an arrangement discourages unrelated third
parties from extending credit or investing equity in the company
because they are more likely than not to be dealing with Vulture
Hedge Fund and not Company A.334 The common law approach
attempted to attack the problem with a narrow focus that led to
inconsistent results.335 The 1980 regulations mimicked this
approach and were abandoned because they were too complex and
promised no better outcome.336 The 2016 regulations broke new
ground in their breadth, which gives the I.R.S. the explicit
authority to use the well-recognized tax doctrines of economic
substance and substance-over-form to look through the formalities
attached to financial instruments to prevent corporations from
disguising equity as debt.337 As adopted, the final regulations give
the I.R.S. the appropriate tools with which to fight abuse, while
leaving corporations the flexibility necessary to operate their
businesses.338 Despite this allowance for flexibility, the final
regulations still provide notice to corporations that any abuses will
be vulnerable to attack and reversal.339
At the end of the day, statutory specificity340 and ambiguity341
need to be in balance in an area as complex as the characterization
333. See supra Part VII.C.3 (analyzing a distressed company loan).
334. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying test (providing background
information on unrelated party loans).
335. See supra Part IV (describing the common law approach).
336. See supra Part V (explaining the 1980 regulations).
337. See supra Part VI (outlining the 2016 regulations).
338. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2 (2016).
339. See generally id.
340. See Jeffrey Partlow, The Necessity of Complexity in the Tax System, 13
WYO. L. REV. 305, 316 (2013) (“As taxpayers unearth new loopholes, Congress
makes changes to the tax laws to avoid and close loopholes, and the result is a
frequently changing Code with a predisposition toward detailed, complex
provisions.”).
341. See Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis and the Law of Conservation of
Ambiguity: Thoughts on Section 385, 36 TAX LAW. 9, 12 (1982) (arguing that
elaborate regulations on whether an instrument is considered debt or equity will
not reduce the aggregate of residual ambiguity).
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of financial instruments as debt or equity. Excessive specificity is
ill-suited to this area of the law, not merely because of the ability
of corporations and their advisors to weave around technical
rules,342 but because of the reality that in certain cases,
particularly those involving distressed companies, there may be
little practical difference between debt and equity. When a highly
leveraged company cannot pay its bills, the entire capital structure
is, for all intents and purposes, equity, and calling a particular part
of its capital structure debt is an exercise in hope over
experience.343 The I.R.S. needs the tools to prevent insiders and
other related parties from avoiding taxes by mischaracterizing
equity investments as debt in such circumstances.344 At the same
time, excessive ambiguity is undesirable because distressed
corporations need as much certainty and guidance as reasonably
possible in ascertaining the tax consequences of their financing
arrangements.345 The 2016 regulations balance these competing
interests and largely succeed where its predecessors failed.346

342. See M.V., Corporate Tax Avoidance: The Price Isn’t Right, ECONOMIST:
SCHUMPETER BLOG (Sept. 21, 2012, 7:23 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/
schumpeter/2012/09/corporate-tax-avoidance (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (observing
that large corporations push into legal grey areas with aggressive tax planning
strategies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
343. See David Bagley, Liquidity is King in the Financial Structure of a
Struggling Company, DAILY DAC (Apr. 30, 2013), https://www.dailydac.com/
commercialbankruptcy/alternatives/articles/liquidity-is-king-financial-structureissues-in-advance-of-insolvency-proceedings (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (noting
that a distress company’s capital structure can be highly relevant to whether the
company will be able to continue operations) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
344. See Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury (Oct. 13, 2016)
(“[T]oday’s final regulations narrowly target problematic earnings stripping
transactions – transactions that generate deductions for interest payments on
related-party debt that does not finance new investment in the United States—
while minimizing unintended consequences for regular business activities.”).
345. See David M. Driesen, Complexity and Simplicity in Law: A Review
Essay (Cass R. Sustein, Simpler: The Future of Government (2013)), 45 ENVTL. L.
181, 186 (2015) (noting that “most complexity commentators associate
uncertainty with the proliferation of very specific rules”).
346. See supra Part VII (providing examples and analyzing the various
governmental approaches to distinguishing debt from equity).
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IX. Proposed Improvements and Recommendations

Any proposed improvements to the documentation
requirements under the 2016 regulations should focus on
providing greater certainty to corporations while preserving the
ability of the government to challenge abusive corporate behavior.
This means addressing two provisions in the regulations that give
the government the authority to recharacterize instruments if it
determines there was no reasonable prospect of repayment347 or if
the parties do not conduct themselves as debtors or creditors.348
The final regulations, while eliminating broad provisions of the
initial proposed regulations, retain the government’s open-ended
ability to recharacterize a broad array of financial instruments as
equity in the documentation requirements, without providing
sufficient guidance to corporations.349
If the government finds there was no reasonable prospect of
repayment of capital invested in a corporation at the time of the
transaction,350 or that the parties are not conducting themselves
as traditional debtors and creditors,351 it can treat the instrument
as equity.352 But the regulations do not set forth any guidance
regarding how to make these determinations and presumably
would look to common law tests for instruction.353 But we see how
common law tests resulted in inconsistent results in this area of
the law.354 More specific guidance is needed that sets forth in detail
347. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iii) (2016) (prescribing the third
indebtedness factor that a corporation must meet to be in compliance with the
documentation requirements).
348. See id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iv) (setting forth the fourth indebtedness factor a
corporation must retain in their documents).
349. See id. § 1.385-2(c)(2) (presenting broad indebtedness factors).
350. See id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iii) (“There must be written documentation
containing information establishing that, as of the date of issuance of the
applicable interest . . . the issuer’s financial position supported a reasonable
expectation that the issuer intended to, and would be able to, meet its
obligations . . . .”).
351. See id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iv) (providing that actions evidencing a debtorcreditor relationship include payment of principal and interest, enforcement of
default and similar events).
352. See id. § 1.385-2(c)(2) (requiring a corporation’s documents to include
proof of the indebtedness factors prescribed in the regulation).
353. See id. (furnishing broad explanations of the indebtedness factors).
354. See Plumb, supra note 10, at 408 (stipulating that courts arrive at
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the characteristics of debt that must be present to avoid
recharacterization of an instrument as equity.
In order to bring greater certainty to the law, the regulations
should provide greater specificity regarding the standards for
determining what constitutes reasonable certainty of repayment
at the time a loan is extended. Rather than a rigid balance sheet
test, however, this should involve a practical analysis of the
company’s current and future liquidity; cash flow; fair market,
value rather than the book value of all of its assets (both balance
sheet and off-balance sheet assets); and business prospects as of
the time the instrument is created. Financial statements often fail
to provide a complete picture of a company’s financial health,
particularly for companies in the technology industry, companies
with significant amounts of intangible assets whose fair market
value does not appear on the balance sheet, companies with off
balance sheet assets, or companies in financial distress whose
assets are quickly declining in value.355 To obtain an accurate and
independent assessment of the likelihood of repayment,
corporations should obtain fairness opinions or similar types of
independent evaluations of their financial condition from an
independent party (i.e., an investment bank, commercial bank, or
consulting firm) at the time the loan is made.356 The Treasury
Department would be free to challenge such analyses.357
different results depending on which common law factors the court wishes to
stress).
355. See TIMOTHY J. GALLAGHER & JOSEPH D. ANDREW, FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 88 (Freeload Press 4th ed. 2007) (1997)
(assessing financial health and finding that “for some firms the financial
statements do not provide the entire picture”).
356. See Fairness Opinion, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/f/fairness-opinion.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2017) (defining a fairness
opinion as “[a] report evaluating the facts of a merger or acquisition” which
“examines the fairness of the offered acquisition price”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
357. Under the 2016 regulations, a corporation may provide additional
documentation to supplement the required documents, but in no circumstance
will it be able to act as a substitute for the required documents. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.385-2(c)(1)(i) (explaining the role of additional documents provided to the
Treasury Department). Third party reports or analysis on whether the issuer
would be able to meet its obligations pursuant to the terms of the loan are not
taken into account if an assertion is made “under law[s] governing an inquiry or
proceeding with respect to the EGI.” Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2)(iii)(C).
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With respect to whether parties conduct themselves as
genuine debtors and creditors, parties seeking debt treatment
should specify their respective rights and obligations in an
indenture or note whose provisions are strictly followed and
enforced. The common law tests placed significant emphasis on
parties enforcing or waiving traditional creditors’ rights when
re-characterizing certain instruments as equity.358 If parties want
to avoid the Treasury Department rewriting their contracts, they
should not only “talk the talk” of lenders but “walk the walk” and
behave like lenders. The more punctilious they are about behaving
like they really loaned and borrowed money, the more difficult it
will be for the government to claim they did not.359 Form only
subsumes substance where substance is illusory; if substance is
real, it should be respected. Drafting agreements with specificity
and conducting themselves in accordance with their agreements,
corporations should minimize the chances that the government
will rewrite their contracts retroactively under the broad
discretion granted by the new regulations.
X. Conclusion
The 2016 Regulations are the end of decades of government
efforts to develop an effective approach to distinguishing debt from
equity. The regulations seek to provide corporations with
reasonable clarity while giving the government the ability to
challenge abusive transactions. The regulations grant the
government broad powers to recharacterize corporate transactions
under two standards contained in the documentation
requirements: (1) whether it is reasonable to expect repayment of
an instrument at the time is entered into,360 and (2) whether the
parties conduct themselves as true debtors and creditors.361 While
358. See supra Part IV.B (explicating how the common law determined
whether there was an objective determination of an intent to create a
debtor-creditor relationship).
359. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2 (a)(1) (2016) (specifying that the documentation
requirement is necessary “for the proper determination of whether certain
instruments will be treated as indebtedness for federal tax purposes”).
360. Id.
361. Id. § 1.385-2(c)(2)(iv).
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an important and useful step forward, these standards should be
improved. The first standard lacks specificity, imposing on
corporations a burden to make the case for the type of treatment
of their transactions that they seek. The common law provides
guidance on the second standard;362 corporations should conduct
themselves in accordance with long-established norms of
debt-creditor relationships to prevent the government from
challenging them. Overall, the 2016 Regulations strike a fair
balance between providing corporations with the type of clarity
that allows them to plan their affairs and giving the government
the ability to challenge abusive transactions that deprive it of tax
revenue.
While the new regulations are in place, there is a possibility
that more change is on the way as part of the Trump
administration’s tax reform efforts363 and litigation challenging
the lawfulness of the 2016 Regulations.364 On April 21, 2017,
President Trump signed an executive order directing the Treasury
Department to review “significant” regulations that were issued in
2016 and 2017 to determine if the regulations are too expensive,
too complex, or exceed the IRS’s statutory authority.365 The order
does not define “significant,” but does state that any earlier
determination under Executive Order 12866 (Sept. 30, 1993) or
whether a tax regulation is “significant” will not be controlling.366
The § 385 regulations may come under review pursuant to this
Order, though at this time the fate of these regulations is
unknown, as are the prospects for serious tax reform. Further, on
362. See supra Part IV.B (presenting the evidentiary factors the common law
uses in order to determine whether there was an objective determination of an
intent to create a debtor-creditor relationship).
363. See Exec. Order No. 13789, 3 C.F.R. § 2 (2017) (“In furtherance of the
policy described in section 1 of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury
(Secretary) shall immediately review all significant tax regulations issued by the
Department of the Treasury on or after January 1, 2016 . . . .” ).
364. See Chris Sanders, U.S. Court Strikes Down Obama-Era Rule on Tax
Inversions, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 29, 2017, 11:03 PM), https://money.usnews.com/
investing/news/articles/2017-09-29/us-court-strikes-down-obama-era-rule-ontax-inversions (last visited Dec. 7, 2017) (reporting on the litigation) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
365. See Exec. Order No. 13789, 3 C.F.R. § 2 (2017) (providing for review of
Obama-Era rules on taxes).
366. Id.
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September 29, 2017 “a federal court in Texas ruled that the Obama
administration acted unlawfully last year when its Treasury
Department cracked down on U.S. companies that try to reduce
their U.S. taxes by rebasing abroad, in a process known as
inversion.”367 While the lawfulness of § 385 is beyond the scope of
this Note, both Trump’s Order and the federal district court
decision from Texas raise questions regarding the ultimate fate of
the § 385 regulations. Corporations are already adjusting to the
new regulations and this uncertainty needs to be resolved as soon
as possible. For the moment, however, the new § 385 regulations
are the only game in town.

367.

Sanders, supra note 364.

